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Abstract
We consider a setup in which the channel from Alice to Bob is less
noisy than the channel from Eve to Bob. We show that there exist encod-
ing and decoding which accomplish error correction and authentication
simultaneously; that is, Bob is able to correctly decode a message coming
from Alice and reject a message coming from Eve with high probability.
The system does not require any secret key shared between Alice and Bob,
provides information theoretic security, and can safely be composed with
other protocols in an arbitrary context.
1 Introduction
Message authentication allows the receiver to verify that the message comes
from the legitimate sender and not from an adversary. Along with secrecy, au-
thentication is one of the most fundamental properties in cryptography. It has
direct real world applications, for example in ensuring that the order for a finan-
cial transaction comes from somebody authorized to perform the transaction,
and not a criminal. Authentication is also used as a primitive in many other
cryptographic protocols, for example key exchange protocols, where it serves to
protect against man-in-the-middle and impersonation attacks.
When defining and proving the security of an authentication scheme, we
distinguish between computational and unconditional security. In the first case,
the definition and proof rely on the assumption that the adversary has lim-
ited computational resources, and often also on the conjecture that a certain
problem cannot be solved within the specified resource bound. On the other
hand, unconditional security makes no assumption on the computational re-
sources available to an adversary; the scheme is guaranteed to be secure against
adversaries with unbounded resources.
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Another important aspect of the definition of security is whether it provides
composability guarantees or not. It is known that certain definitions of security,
although intuitively appealing, fail to guarantee that a cryptographic scheme re-
mains secure in an arbitrary context. One of the known examples is a criterion
based on the accessible information used in early security proofs for Quantum
Key Distribution. Reference [9] shows that it is possible for a protocol to satisfy
this security criterion, but nevertheless the resulting key cannot be used for
one-time pad encryption of a message whose header is known to the adversary.
Examples such as this one motivate the introduction of frameworks for com-
posable security such as [4, 2, 13]; protocols proven secure in such a framework
are guaranteed to compose safely with other protocols in the framework, and to
remain secure in an arbitrary context.
In this paper, we consider the strongest possible type of message authentica-
tion: we focus on composable, unconditionally secure schemes. It is known that
for message authentication to work, Alice and Bob need to have some initial
advantage over their adversary Eve; otherwise, Eve can impersonate Alice to
Bob and Bob to Alice. What can the initial advantage be?
Previous research on authentication in information theoretic cryptography
has focused on the scenario in which Alice and Bob share randomness that is
secret from their adversary Eve. Information theoretically secure authentica-
tion can be achieved using universal2 classes of hash functions [31]: Alice and
Bob share a secret key k that encodes a particular function hk from a suitable
class of hash functions. To send message m to Bob, Alice computes the tag
t = hk(m) and sends (m, t). To verify that (m, t) comes from Alice, Bob checks
that t = hk(m). Research on this scenario has focused on finding suitable classes
of functions for authentication and on proving lower bounds on the secret key
size needed for a given level of security; see, for example, [26, 27, 29, 30, 19].
A variant of the basic scheme for authentication by universal hashing involves
recycling part of the key when authenticating multiple messages; this was pro-
posed in [31, Section 4]. Recently, the composable security of authentication
by universal hashing both with and without key recycling has been established
[22].
A strong motivation for exploring different possibilities to obtain a com-
posable, unconditionally secure authenticated channel comes from the study of
information-theoretically secure key distribution protocols in classical [18, 1] and
quantum [3, 7] cryptography. These key distribution protocols require interac-
tion between the honest participants over an authenticated channel. If Alice and
Bob need an initial secret key for authentication, these protocols become key
expansion rather than key distribution protocols. The investigation of whether
the requirements for authentication can be lowered [14, 15, 16, 24, 25] led to
the development of interactive authentication protocols, in which only partially
secret and partially correlated strings suffice. In [24], an interactive protocol for
authentication is proposed that works even if the adversary knows a substantial
fraction of the secret key. In [25], it was shown that this interactive authentica-
tion protocol, combined with an information reconciliation protocol, can work
even in the case when the randomness initially given to Alice and Bob is not
2
perfectly but only partly correlated.
In this paper, we depart from the model of common randomness shared by
Alice and Bob. The inspiration for this comes from the work Wyner [32] on
the wiretap channel and Csizar and Korner [6] on the broadcast channel with
confidential messages. In these papers, it is shown that if the channel from
Alice to Bob is less noisy than the channel from Alice to Eve, suitable encoding
and decoding exist which accomplish error correction and secrecy simultane-
ously: Bob can correctly decode Alice’s message, but Eve remains ignorant of
it. In the present paper, we ask whether a similar phenomenon is possible for
authentication instead of secrecy, and we give an affirmative answer.
Another motivation for the present work is the study of authentication in
the context of quantum key distribution. The results we prove in this paper,
combined with the analysis of the composition of QKD and authentication [21,
23], show that QKD can be performed over insecure classical and quantum
channels, between two parties who share no randomness initially, provided that
the classical channel between them is less noisy than the channel between them
and the adversary.
As far as the present author is aware, the idea of using an advantage in chan-
nel noise for composable, unconditionally secure message authentication has not
been explored before. The closest that the present author has been able to find
in the cryptography literature is [10], which considers the problem of running
a traditional, key-based authentication protocol over a wiretap channel. Also
interesting are a number of methods for authentication used in physical layer
security for wireless networks. These methods exploit unique characteristics of
the software or hardware of different devices, or unique characteristics of the
channel between two locations, to identify legitimate from malicious signals. An
overview of these techniques can be found in the surveys [20, Section VIII-D]
and [33].
The multiple access channel from network information theory [5, Section
15.3] is also related to the present paper in that the multiple access channel has
many senders and one receiver. However, all the senders and the receiver in
the multiple access channel cooperate; they choose their encoding and decoding
rules together so as to achieve certain rates of transmission from each sender
to the receiver. In our setup, Alice and Bob cooperate, but Eve is malicious.
She observes the encoding and decoding rules that Alice and Bob have agreed
upon, and tries her best to fool Bob into accepting a message from her as if it
is a genuine message from Alice.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
the notation and certain basic results that we will use. In Section 3, we intro-
duce Abstract Cryptography, the framework for composable security that we
will use. In Section 4 we formally explain how an authenticated channel can
be constructed from an advantage in channel noise, and we prove that the con-
struction is composable and provides information theoretic security. In Section
5 we discuss some extensions of the results from the previous section, and in
Section 6 we conclude the paper and note some possible directions for future
work.
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2 Preliminaries
We will often treat the set {0, 1}n as a vector space over the field with two
elements; thus, for v, w ∈ {0, 1}n, v + w = (v1 + w1, . . . , vn + wn) and for a
vector v and a subset S, v + S = {v + w : w ∈ S}.
By a Bernoulli random variable with parameter p we mean a random variable
X such that Pr(X = 0) = 1 − p and Pr(X = 1) = p. We will often work with
sequences of i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables, where the abbreviation i.i.d.
stands for independent, identically distributed.
The notion of typical sequences plays a central role in information theory:
Definition 1. A sequence x = (x1, x2, . . . xn) ∈ {0, 1}
n is called δ-typical for a
sequence X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) of i.i.d. Bernoulli(p) random variables if
|
1
n
logPr(X = x) + h(p)| < δ
where h(p) = −p log(p) − (1 − p) log(1 − p) is the binary entropy function.1
We denote the set of all δ-typical sequences for n i.i.d. Bernoulli(p) random
variables by T (n, p, δ).
An important result in information theory is the Theorem of Typical Se-
quences [5, Theorems 3.1.1-3.1.2]:
Theorem 1. Let X1, X2, . . . be a sequence of i.i.d Bernoulli(p) random vari-
ables. Then,
∀δ > 0, lim
n→∞
Pr((X1, . . .Xn) ∈ T (n, p, δ)) = 1
In addition, we have the bound
|T (n, p, δ)| ≤ 2n(h(p)+δ)
on the number of δ-typical sequences
A simple but fruitful model for a noisy communication channel is given by the
Binary Symmetric Channel. The Binary Symmetric Channel with parameter p
acts on each input bit independently, transmitting it faithfully with probability
(1− p) and flipping it with probability p. Thus, when the vector v ∈ {0, 1}n is
input into this channel, the output is v + U where U = (U1, . . . Un) is a vector
of i.i.d. Bernoulli(p) random variables.
3 Abstract Cryptography
In this section, we introduce Abstract Cryptography, the framework for com-
posable security that we will use. The general case of Abstract Cryptography
was introduced in [13]; however, for our purposes, it is sufficient to consider the
special case for honest Alice and Bob and malicious Eve as developed in [12].
1All logarithms are taken to base 2.
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3.1 An algebra of resources and converters
By a resource, we mean a system with three interfaces where Alice, Bob and Eve
can enter inputs and receive outputs. We will denote resources by calligraphic
letters, for example R. It will be convenient to specify the functionality of a
resource by giving pseudo-code for it; for example, a channel from Alice to Bob
that provides authentication but no secrecy can be described as ”on input m
from Alice, output m to Bob and Eve. On input m′ from Eve, output ⊥ to
Bob.” where we use ⊥ to denote an error message.
On the set of resources, we have a parallel composition operation, denoted
by ‖, which takes two resources and returns another resource. Thus, R‖S is a
resource that provides Alice, Bob and Eve with access to the interfaces of both
R and S.
By converter, we mean a system with an inside and an outside interface,
where the inside interface interacts with a resource and the outside interface
interacts with a user. If α is a converter, R is a resource and i ∈ {A,B,E} is
an interface, then αiR is another resource, where user i has the interface of the
converter α, and the other two users have their usual interfaces to R.
3.2 Distinguishers, distance, construction
By a distinguisher, we mean a system with four interfaces, three of which connect
to the interfaces of a resource, and the fourth one outputs 0 or 1. Thus, a
distinguisher D connected to a resource R is a system that outputs a single bit.
We use distinguishers to define a notion of distance between resources:
Definition 2. The distance between two resources R,S is
d(R,S) = sup
D
|Pr(DR = 1)− Pr(DS = 1)|
We take the supremum over all distinguishers D, placing no restriction on
their computational resources. This corresponds to choosing to consider uncon-
ditional security (in another terminology information theoretic security).
From the definition, we can prove that d(·, ·) has the properties of a pseudo-
metric on the set of resources:
Proposition 1. For all resources R,S, T
1. (Identity) d(R,R) = 0.
2. (Symmetry) d(R,S) = d(S,R).
3. (Triangle inequality) d(R,S) + d(S, T ) ≥ d(R, T ).
We can also prove that d has two additional useful properties, which formally
capture the intuition ”if R,S are close, then they remain close in an arbitrary
context”:
Proposition 2. For all resources R,S, T , converters α and interfaces i ∈
{A,B,E}
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1. (Non-increasing under a converter)
d(αiR, αiS) ≤ d(R,S)
2. (Non-increasing under a resource in parallel)
d(R‖T ,S‖T ) ≤ d(R,S)
To prove this proposition, observe that a subset of all distinguishers apply
the converter α or add the resource T in parallel.
Before we can proceed to the definition of construction, we need to introduce
protocols, filters, and simulators. By a protocol, we mean a pair of converters,
one for Alice and one for Bob. By a filter, we mean a converter for Eve’s interface
of a resource which blocks malicious actions from Eve; we will use symbols such
as ♯, ♭ to denote the filters for different resources. By a simulator, we mean a
converter for Eve’s interface of a resource; the goal of a simulator is to make the
interface of one resource appear as the interface of another.
Now we are ready to define construction.
Definition 3. We say that a protocol π = (πA, πB) constructs resource S from
resource R within ǫ, denoted R
π,ǫ
−−→ S, if
1. (ǫ-close with Eve blocked) d(πAπB♯ER, ♭ES) < ǫ
2. (ǫ-close with full access for Eve) There exists a simulator σE such that
d(πAπBR, σES) < ǫ.
The typical interpretation of the definition of construction is the following:
S is the goal, the ideal functionality that Alice and Bob want to achieve. R
is the real resource that they have available. The combination of π and R is
required to be indistinguishable from S in two scenarios: with Eve blocked and
with Eve present.
Since Eve’s interfaces to R and S may be different, we need to allow for the
simulator σ in the second condition of the definition. If S is considered secure,
then σES should be considered at least as secure; this is because a subset of all
strategies for Eve against S apply the converter σ.
3.3 General composition theorem
The notion of construction provides both parallel and sequential composition,
as captured in the following theorem [12, Theorem 1]:
Theorem 2. 1. (Parallel Composition) If R
π,ǫ
−−→ S and R′
π′,ǫ′
−−−→ S ′ then
R‖R′
π‖π′,ǫ+ǫ′
−−−−−−→ S‖S ′.
2. (Sequential Composition) If R
π,ǫ
−−→ S and S
π′,ǫ′
−−−→ T then R
π′π,ǫ+ǫ′
−−−−−→ T .
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3. (Identity) For the identity protocol 1 = (1A,1B) and any resource R,
R
1,0
−−→ R.
This theorem captures formally the idea that if an ideal resource can be
constructed from a real resource and a protocol, then the construction can
safely be used instead of the ideal resource in an arbitrary context.
4 Constructing an authenticated channel from
an advantage in channel noise
In this section, we show how Alice and Bob can use an advantage in channel
noise to construct an authenticated channel.
First, we look at the goal: the ideal authenticated channel that Alice and
Bob want to construct. The resource An for transmitting n-bit authenticated
messages from Alice to Bob is defined by the pseudo-code:
1. On input m ∈ {0, 1}n from Alice, output m to Bob and Eve.
2. On input m′ from Eve, output ⊥ to Bob.
Thus, Bob gets the guarantee: if anything other than⊥ is output by the channel,
then it must have come from Alice.
Next, we look at the noisy channel that Alice and Bob have available. Let
0 ≤ p < q ≤ 1/2 and consider the resource Nnp,q defined by the pseudo-code:
1. On input m ∈ {0, 1}n from Alice, draw U1, U2, . . . Un i.i.d. Bernoulli(p)
random variables and output m + U = (m1 + U1, . . . ,mn + Un) to Bob.
Also output m to Eve.
2. On input m′ ∈ {0, 1}n from Eve, draw V1, . . . , Vn i.i.d. Bernoulli(q)
random variables and output m′ + V = (m′1 + V1, . . . ,m
′
n + Vn) to Bob.
Thus, n-bit messages from Alice go through a binary symmetric channel with
parameter p, while n-bit messages from Eve go through a binary symmetric
channel with parameter q.
To construct the ideal from the real resource, Alice and Bob use suitable
encoding and decoding of messages. We will denote by En Alice’s encoding for
transmission over Nnp,q, and by D
n Bob’s corresponding decoding. Our main
result is the following:
Theorem 3. Let 0 ≤ p < q ≤ 1/2. Then, for any r < h(q) − h(p), for any
ǫ > 0 and for all sufficiently large n, there exists a protocol πn = (En, Dn) such
that Nnp,q
πn,ǫ
−−−→ Arn.
To prove this theorem, we observe that there are two ways that the real
system EnAD
n
BN
n
p,q can fail:
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1. Alice sends a message to Bob, which he decodes incorrectly or rejects.
We call this decoding error and denote the maximum probability of it
occurring by pde.
2. Eve sends a message to Bob, which he accepts and decodes. We call this
false acceptance and denote the maximum probability of it occurring by
pfa
Then, in the first part of the proof, we show that there exist suitable encoding
for Alice and decoding for Bob such that pde, pfa are both small. This is stated
formally in the following proposition, which we prove in subsection 4.1:
Proposition 3. Let 0 ≤ p < q ≤ 1/2. Then, for any r < h(q)−h(p), any ǫ > 0
and all sufficiently large n, there exist encoding and decoding of rn bit messages
to n bit codewords such that pde < ǫ and pfa < ǫ.
In the second part of the proof, we show that if a real system has small
probability of decoding error and of false acceptance, then this real system
constructs the ideal system in the sense of Definition 3. In section 4.2, we show
the following:
Proposition 4. Let πn = (En, Dn) be a protocol encoding rn bit messages into
n bit codewords. Suppose the real system EnAD
n
BN
n
p,q has probability of decoding
error pde and probability of false acceptance pfa. Then,
1. d(EnAD
n
B♯EN
n
p,q, ♭EA
rn) = pde.
2. There is a simulator σ such that
d(EnAD
n
BN
n
p,q, σEA
rn) = max(pde, pfa)
Now, we can complete the proof of Theorem 3: it follows immediately from
Propositions 3 and 4. All that is left to do is to prove the two propositions,
which we do in the following subsections.
4.1 Good encoding and decoding exist
In this section, we show that encoding for Alice and decoding for Bob exist
that make the probabilities of decoding error and false acceptance both small,
thereby proving Proposition 3. We follow the proof of the noisy channel coding
theorem [5, Chapter 7] to bound the probability of decoding error, and perform
an additional analysis to bound also the probability of false acceptance.
The encoding for Alice consists of selecting 2rn codewords {c1, . . . , c2rn} ⊂
{0, 1}n. The decoding for Bob will be typical sequence decoding: Bob will
decode the set of output sequences ci + T (n, p, δ) to message i. More precisely,
Bob’s decoding can be described by the pseudo-code ”on input y, if there is a
unique i such that y ∈ ci + T (n, p, δ) then output i, otherwise output ⊥.”
Now, given r < h(q)−h(p) and ǫ > 0, we choose δ < (h(q)−h(p)− r)/3 and
we use the probabilistic method to show the existence of two codebooks for Alice:
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a codebook of 2rn+1 codewords achieving an average probability of decoding
error at most ǫ/2, and a codebook of 2rn codewords achieving a maximum
probability of decoding error at most ǫ.
We focus on the first codebook. We choose random variablesC1, C2, . . . , C2rn+1
independently, uniformly from {0, 1}n and let this be our codebook. Now sup-
pose Alice inputs Ci into the channel, and Bob gets Y = Ci + U . By the union
bound, the probability of decoding error is then
Pr(decoding error on input Ci)
≤ Pr(Y /∈ Ci + T (n, p, δ)) +
∑
j 6=i
Pr(Y ∈ Cj + T (n, p, δ))
The first term goes to zero as n goes to infinity, by the theorem of typical
sequences 1. The second term is bounded by
2rn+1
|T (n, p, δ)|
2n
≤ 2 · 2−n(1−r−h(p)−δ)
which also goes to zero as n goes to infinity.
Thus, for a random codebook
1
2rn+1
2rn+1∑
i=1
Pr(decoding error on input Ci)
goes to zero as n goes to infinity. Therefore, for any ǫ and for all sufficiently
large n, there exist particular codebooks {c1, . . . , c2rn+1} such that
1
2rn+1
2rn+1∑
i=1
Pr(decoding error on input ci) <
ǫ
2
Picking the best 2rn codewords of such a codebook, we obtain a codebook of
size 2rn such that the maximum probability of decoding error is at most ǫ.
Next, we need to analyze the probability that Bob accepts a message coming
form Eve. The set of channel outputs that Bob accepts is
S ⊆ ∪2
rn
i=1(ci + T (n, p, δ))
What is the probability that Eve’s message is corrupted to an output in this
set?
Suppose Eve inputs z into the channel, resulting in output Y = z + V for
Bob. Then
Pr(Y ∈ S) ≤ Pr(V is not δ-typical) + |S|2−n(h(q)−δ)
≤ Pr(V is not δ-typical) + 2rn2n(h(p)+δ)2−n(h(q)−δ)
Both of these terms go to zero as n goes to infinity. Thus, for all sufficiently
large n the probability of false acceptance will be below ǫ.
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4.2 Construction in the sense of Abstract Cryptography.
In the previous subsection, we established that it is possible for a real system
to achieve simultaneously low probabilities of decoding error and of false accep-
tance. In this subsection, we show that these low probabilities imply that the
real system constructs the ideal system in the sense of Abstract Cryptography.
We will do this by proving Proposition 4.
First, it is helpful to take a step back and develop some general tools for
evaluating the distance d(·, ·) between resources. Our first lemma shows that
we can restrict attention to distinguishers following a deterministic strategy:
Lemma 1. Let R,S be two resources. Then, for any ǫ > 0, there is a deter-
ministic distinguisher D such that
|Pr(DR = 1)− Pr(DS = 1)| > d(R,S)− ǫ
Proof. Let D′ be any distinguisher such that
|Pr(D′R = 1)− Pr(D′S = 1)| > d(R,S)− ǫ
If D′ is deterministic we are done. Otherwise, D′ is a probabilistic mixture
of deterministic distinguishers, and there must exist a deterministic D in this
mixture such that
|Pr(DR = 1)− Pr(DS = 1)| ≥ |Pr(D′R = 1)− Pr(D′S = 1) > d(R,S)− ǫ
Next, we focus on evaluating the distance between resources that provide
no interaction or only one round of interaction. It is known that for resources
that provide a single output, the distinguishing advantage is half the l1 distance
between the output probability distributions:
Lemma 2. Let R,S be two resources that take no input and provide an output
in some discrete set. Then, using r, s to denote the probability distributions over
outputs, we have
d(R,S) =
1
2
‖r − s‖1 =
1
2
∑
x
|r(x) − s(x)|
Proof. Let D be the distinguisher given by pseudo-code ”On input x, if r(x) >
s(x) output 1, else output 0.” Then,
Pr(DR = 1)− Pr(DS = 1) =
∑
x:r(x)>s(x)
(r(x) − s(x)) =
1
2
‖r − s‖1
Now let D′ be any other distinguisher. Without loss of generality, assume
Pr(D′R = 1) ≥ Pr(D′S = 1) (otherwise flip the output bit of D′). Let t(x) be
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the probability that D′ outputs 1 on input x. Then
Pr(DR = 1)− Pr(DS = 1)− Pr(D′R = 1) + Pr(D′S = 1)
=
∑
x:r(x)>s(x)
(1− t(x))(r(x) − s(x)) +
∑
x:r(x)≤s(x)
t(x)(s(x) − r(x)) ≥ 0
Now we extend this result to resources that take one input and return one
output.
Lemma 3. Let R,S be two resources that take an input in some discrete set
and provide an output in some (possibly different) discrete set. Let r(y|x), s(y|x)
be the respective conditional probabilities over outputs given inputs. Then,
d(R,S) = max
x
1
2
‖r(·|x)− s(·|x)‖1
Proof. From Lemma 1 we know that we can restrict attention to deterministic
distinguishers. Now, we consider a deterministic distinguisher between R and
S whose strategy is to enter input x. The distinguisher is now in a position to
try to tell the difference between the output distributions r(·|x) and s(·|x); by
Lemma 2 we know that the best advantage of such a distinguisher is
1
2
‖r(·|x) − s(·|x)‖1
To complete the proof, it remains to observe that the best distinguishing advan-
tage between R and S is obtained by the deterministic distinguisher that uses
the optimal input.
Now, we can complete the proof of Proposition 4:
Proof. First, we show that d(EnAD
n
B♯EN
n
p,q, ♭EA
rn) = pde. Both resources take
a single input x ∈ {0, 1}rn at Alice’s interface and return a single output y ∈
{0, 1}rn at Bob’s interface. The ideal resource always has y = x, while the real
resource occasionally makes an error in the transmission; thus, from Lemma 3,
we have
d(EnAD
n
B♯EN
n
p,q, ♭EA
rn) = max
x
Pr(EnAD
n
B♯EN
n
p,q makes error on input x) = pde
Next, we consider the second part of Proposition 4. First, we have to choose
a suitable simulator. When Alice inputs a message x ∈ {0, 1}rn to the real
resource EnAD
n
BN
n
p,q, the codeword cx comes out uncorrupted at Eve’s interface.
On the other hand, when Alice inputs x to the ideal resource Arn, x itself
appears at Eve’s interface. Therefore, we want σ to take x and convert it to
the corresponding codeword cx. Further, the real resource E
n
AD
n
BN
n
p,q expects
inputs of size n at Eve’s interface, while the ideal resource Arn expects inputs
of size rn. Therefore, the simulator σ has to convert Eve’s inputs of size n into
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inputs of size rn. Since Arn outputs an error to Bob on any input from Eve,
it does not matter how σ maps {0, 1}n to {0, 1}rn; thus, we can assume for
simplicity that σ maps any n bit input from Eve to a sequence of rn zeros. To
summarize, we choose the simulator σ given by the pseudo-code: ”On input x
at the inside interface, output cx at the outside interface. On input z at the
outside interface, output rn zeros at the inside interface.”
Now, we have to evaluate d(EnAD
n
BN
n
p,q, σEA
rn). From the point of view of a
distinguisher, both the real and the ideal resources are single input single output
devices: the inputs (Alice− In,Eve− In) are of the form (x, ”no− input”) or
(”no− input”, z) and the outputs (Eve−Out,Bob−Out) are of the form (cx, y)
or (”no − output”, y). Thus, Lemma 3 applies. If the distinguisher chooses
an input of the form (x, ”no − input”), then his maximum advantage is the
probability that the real system makes decoding error on input x from Alice.
If the distinguisher chooses an input of the form (”no − input”, z), then his
maximum advantage is the probability that the real system does not output an
error to Bob. Thus, we obtain
d(EnAD
n
BN
n
p,q, σEA
rn) = max(pde, pfa)
as needed.
5 Extensions
In this section we consider some extensions of the results of the previous section.
First, we consider an extension to more general models of a noisy channel. Then,
we consider the possibility of proving a converse result. Next, we consider
an extension that allows the adversary to block messages from Alice to Bob.
Finally, we consider the computational efficiency of encoding and decoding.
5.1 More general models of a noisy channel
Let X,Y,Z be finite alphabets for Alice’s input, Bob’s output and Eve’s input
respectively. Let P (·|·) and Q(·|·) be two sets of conditional probabilities and
consider the real resource NnP,Q for transmitting n-symbol words given by the
pseudo-code:
1. On input x = (x1, . . . , xn) from Alice, output Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) to Bob,
where Yi is drawn independently according to the distribution P (·|xi).
Also output x to Eve.
2. On input z = (z1, . . . , zn) from Eve, output Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) to Bob,
where Yi is drawn independently according to the distribution Q(·|zi).
Thus, Alice’s messages pass through a discrete memoryless channel with tran-
sition probabilities P and Eve’s messages pass through a discrete memoryless
channel with transition probabilities Q.
Using essentially the same argument as the proof of Theorem 3 in Section 4
we obtain:
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Theorem 4. For every
r < sup
PX
(
min{IP (X ;Y ),min
z
HQ(Y |Z = z)−HP (Y |X)}
)
(1)
for every ǫ > 0 and for all sufficiently large n, there exist a protocol πn =
(En, Dn) such that NnP,Q
π,ǫ
−−→ Arn.
In equation (1), I(·; ·) denotes the mutual information, H(·|·) denotes the
conditional Shannon entropy, and the subscript P or Q denotes the probability
mass function which is used to compute the corresponding entropic quantities.
The supremum is taken over all probability mass functions PX on X, where each
choice of PX , combined with the transition probabilities P (·|·) induces a joint
probability mass function PXY on X× Y.
For the case when both P and Q are weakly symmetric [5, Section 7.2] (i.e.
the vectors P (·|x) for different x are permutations of each other and the sums∑
x P (y|x) are the same for all y, and similarly for Q), the right hand side of
equation (1) simplifies to an expression with a nice intuitive interpretation:
sup
PX
(
min{IP (X ;Y ),min
z
HQ(Y |Z = z)−HP (Y |X)}
)
= HQ(Y |Z = z)−HP (Y |X = x)
= (log |Y| −HP (Y |X = x))− (log |Y| −HQ(Y |Z = z)) = CA→B − CE→B
Thus, if both channels are weakly symmetric, Alice can transmit information to
Bob at any rate up to the difference between the capacity of the channel from
Alice to Bob and the capacity of the channel from Eve to Bob.
We proceed to prove Theorem 4. Again, we look at the two cases of decoding
error and false acceptance. Proposition 4 from Section 4 carries over to this
setting as well, because its proof does not rely on the size of the alphabets at
the three terminals. What remains to be done is to show that low probabilities
of decoding error and false acceptance are simultaneously achievable. We have
the following:
Proposition 5. For any
r < sup
PX
(
min{IP (X ;Y ),min
z
HQ(Y |Z = z)−HP (Y |X)}
)
any ǫ > 0 and all sufficiently large n, there exists encoding and decoding of rn
bit messages into n symbol codewords such that pde < ǫ and pfa < ǫ.
Proof. We need the notion of joint typicality [5, Section 7.6]:
Definition 4. Let (X,Y ) be a pair of random variables taking values in X×Y
with joint probability mass function P . Let (X1, Y1), (X2, Y2), . . . be a sequence
of i.i.d. pairs, each pair having the same distribution as (X,Y ). Let (Xn, Y n) =
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(X1 . . . Xn, Y1 . . . Yn). An element (x
n, yn) = (x1 . . . xn, y1 . . . yn) ∈ Xn × Yn is
jointly δ-typical if
|
1
n
logPr((Xn, Y n) = (xn, yn)) +H(X,Y )| < δ
|
1
n
logPr(Xn = xn) +H(X)| < δ
|
1
n
logPr(Y n = yn) +H(Y )| < δ
The set of all jointly δ-typical sequences for length n and probability mass func-
tion P is denoted JT (n, P, δ)
Theorem 5. In the setup from the definition above, we have
∀δ > 0 lim
n→∞
Pr((Xn, Y n) ∈ JT (n, P, δ)) = 1
Moreover, if X˜n, Y˜ n are independent and have the same marginals as Xn, Y n,
then
Pr((X˜n, Y˜ n) ∈ JT (n, P, δ)) ≤ 2−n(I(X;Y )−3δ)
Now, we can proceed to prove Proposition 5. As in Section 4, we follow
the proof of the noisy channel coding theorem [5, Chapter 7] to bound the
probability of decoding error, and perform an additional analysis to bound also
the probability of false acceptance. Let PX and δ be such that
r + 3δ < min{IP (X ;Y ),min
z
HQ(Y |Z = z)−HP (Y |X)}
Alice chooses codewords C1, . . . C2rn+1 at random, with each symbol of each
codeword being independent with probability mass function PX . Bob uses
jointly-typical decoding: ”On input yn, if there is a unique i such that (Ci, y
n) ∈
JT (n, P, δ) then decode to i, otherwise output ⊥.”
If Alice inputs Ci into the channel and Bob gets output Y
n, then Bob’s
probability of decoding error is
Pr(Decoding error on input Ci)
≤ Pr((Ci, Y
n) /∈ JT (n, P, δ)) +
∑
j 6=i
Pr((Cj , Y
n) ∈ JT (n, P, δ))
and both terms go to zero as n goes to infinity, by Theorem 5 and the choice of
r, δ, PX .
Thus, for any ǫ > 0 and all sufficiently large n, there exist particular code-
books {c1, . . . c2rn+1} such that
1
2rn+1
∑
i
Pr(Decoding error on input ci) <
ǫ
2
Picking the best 2rn codewords of such a codebook, we obtain a codebook of
size 2rn and maximum probability of decoding error at most ǫ.
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Next, we need to bound the probability that Bob accepts a message coming
from Eve. Let Si ⊂ Yn be the set of channel outputs that Bob decodes to i. We
will bound the number of elements of Si: using the definition of joint typicality
we get
2−n(H(X)−δ) ≥ PXn(ci) ≥
∑
yn∈Si
PXnY n(ci, y
n) ≥ |Si|2
−n(H(X,Y )+δ)
so |Si| ≤ 2n(H(Y |X)+2δ).
Now suppose that Eve inputs zn in the channel and Bob gets output Y n.
What is the probability that Bob doesn’t decode to ⊥?
Pr(Y n ∈ ∪2
rn
i Si) ≤ Pr(Y
n is not δ-typical) + 2−
∑
n
i=1 HQ(Y |Z=zi)+nδ
2rn∑
i=1
|Si|
≤ Pr(Y n is not δ-typical) + 2−n(minz HQ(Y |Z=z)−HP (Y |X)−r−3δ)
and both terms go to zero as n goes to infinity.2 This completes the proof of
Proposition 5.
Now, we can also complete the proof of Theorem 4: it follows immediately
from Propositions 4 and 5.
5.2 A converse result?
A natural question is whether one can prove a converse result; that is, whether
one can prove that if Alice and Bob attempt to transmit information at a rate
r > sup
PX
(
min{IP (X,Y ),min
z
HQ(Y |Z = z)−HP (Y |X)}
)
bits per channel use, then they must necessarily sacrifice either error correction
or authentication. We give an example showing that this is not the case.
Let the alphabet for Alice be {0, 1}, the alphabet for Bob be {0, 1, 2, 3}, and
the alphabet for Eve be {0, 1}. Let the transition probabilities from Alice to
Bob be
P (0|0) = P (1|1) = 1− p, P (0|1) = P (1|0) = p
all other probabilities being zero. Thus, the channel from Alice to Bob is a
binary symmetric channel with parameter p, that only uses the first two symbols
of Bob’s alphabet. Let the transition probabilities from Eve to Bob be
Q(2|0) = Q(3|1) = 1
2Note that in bounding the probability that Y n is not δ-typical, we have used an extension
of the theorem of typical sequences to handle the case of a sequence of random variables that
are independent but not necessarily identically distributed; this extension has the same proof:
Chebyshev’s Inequality ⇒ Law of Large Numbers ⇒ Theorem of Typical Sequences.
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all other probabilities being zero. Thus, the channel from Eve to Bob is a perfect
binary channel that uses only the second two symbols of Bob’s alphabet. Then,
the upper bound from equation (1) is −h(p) < 0. Nevertheless, it is clear that
Alice and Bob can transmit at any rate up to the capacity 1−h(p) of the binary
symmetric channel between them and can achieve both authentication and error
correction. Indeed, Bob can tell that a message comes from Eve by the presence
of output symbols 2, 3 from the channel.
This example shows that the upper bound on the rate given by equation (1)
is not a fundamental limit but is an artifact of the particular proof technique
used. It also shows that it is possible to simultaneously achieve error correction
and authentication in certain cases where the channel from Alice to Bob is more
noisy than the channel from Eve to Bob.
5.3 Adversaries that can block messages
Certain treatments of authenticated channels, for example [22], allow the adver-
sary to block Alice’s messages from reaching Bob for both the real and the ideal
resource. We can model this by adding the following line to the pseudo-code of
both the real resource NnP,Q and the ideal resource A
n:
0. On input b ∈ {0, 1} at a (separate) Eve interface, if b = 0 then do not
output anything to Bob in line 1.
This extra option for the adversary Eve necessitates a small modification
in the proof of Proposition 4: the filters ♯E , ♭E have to always input b = 1
to their respective resources, the simulator σ has to convey the bit b from the
outside to the inside interface, and the distinguisher D has to consider inputs
(Alice− In,Eve− In) of the form (x, z, b) where x is a string or ”no− input”,
z is a string or ”no − input”, b ∈ {0, 1}, and if b = 1 then at least one of x, z
has to be ”no− input”.
5.4 Efficient encoding and decoding
In this subsection, we return to the Binary Symmetric Channel model from
Section 4. At first sight, Theorem 3 looks like an existential result: it states
the existence of good encoding and decoding, but does not give an explicit
construction, neither does it specify the required computational resources for
good encoding and decoding.
However, if we look closely at the proof, we see that it depends only on the
following: the set of all channel outputs that Bob accepts is too small from the
point of view of Eve, so that an input from Eve is unlikely to be corrupted into
this set. Thus, we can take any class of error correcting codes with efficient
encoding and decoding, for example low density parity check codes [8, 28, 11],
and within that class we can choose a code with the number of codewords and
the radius of the hamming balls decoded to each codeword as required for the
proof of Theorem 3.
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6 Conclusion and future work
We have shown that if the channel from Alice to Bob is less noisy than the
channel from Eve to Bob, then Alice and Bob can accomplish error correction
and message authentication simultaneously. The intuition behind the result is
that for long sequences, there is a subset S of the channel outputs for Bob such
that S is large when measured by the probability that a codeword from Alice
is corrupted into it, and S is also small when measured by the probability that
any input from Eve is corrupted into it.
To ensure seamless integration of the authentication scheme proposed here
with other cryptographic protocols, we have proved it provides composable,
information theoretic security using the Abstract Cryptography framework. We
have also shown that error correcting codes with efficient encoding and decoding
can be used, as long as the set S of outputs that Bob accepts is small from the
point of view of Eve.
The present paper raises a number of interesting questions that can be the
subject of future work; we list some of them here. First, what is the set of
all rates r such that Alice and Bob can transmit information at rate r bits per
channel use and achieve both error correction and authentication? In the present
paper, we have shown that rates up to a certain bound are always achievable,
but have also given an example where a rate higher than the bound is possible.
Thus, the complete characterization of the achievable rates is still not known.
Second, would allowing two way communication and interaction between Alice
and Bob give further possibilities, as was the case for secrecy in the wiretap
channel [17], and for authentication in the shared randomness model [24, 25]?
Third, is it possible to combine the coding for the broadcast channel and for the
authentication channel to achieve error correction, authentication and secrecy
simultaneously?
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